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Abstract 
In court, the basic expectation is that eyewitness accounts are solely based on what the 
witness saw. Research on post-event influences has shown that this is not always the case and 
memory distortions are quite common. However, potential effects of an eyewitness’ 
attributions regarding a perpetrator’s crime motives have been widely neglected in this 
domain. In this paper, we present two experiments (N = 209) in which eyewitnesses were led 
to conclude that a perpetrator’s motives for a crime were either dispositional or situational. As 
expected, misinformation consistent with an eyewitness’ attribution of crime motives was 
typically falsely recognised as true whereas inconsistent misinformation was correctly 
rejected. Furthermore, a dispositional vs. situational attribution of crime motives resulted in 
more severe (mock) sentencing supporting previous research. The findings are discussed in 
the context of schema-consistent biases and the effect of attributions about character in a legal 
setting. 
[146 words] 
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Attribution of Crime Motives biases Eyewitnesses’ Memory and Sentencing Decisions 
Expectations can bias memory of an observed event (e.g., Kleider, Pezdek, Goldinger, 
& Kirk, 2008; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001) as well as eyewitness identifications (e.g., 
Charman, Gregory, & Carlucci, 2009; also see Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013). In the present 
research, we demonstrate that an individual’s attributions of a perpetrator’s crime motives can 
influence memory of a witnessed crime as well as sentencing decisions. 
The misinformation effect (i.e., impairment in the memory of a witnessed event 
following subsequently presented misinformation; Loftus, 1979) is well-established (see 
Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011; Loftus, 2005). In studies on the misinformation effect, 
participants receive some original information (encoding phase), keep it in their memories for 
a certain time (retention phase) and are finally asked to recall it (retrieval phase). In each 
phase, the originally encoded information is susceptible to outside influences (e.g., talking 
about the observed event; Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; Wang, Paterson, & Kemp, 
2014) as well as inner distortions (e.g., expectations; Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Kleider et al., 
2008). 
Although the misinformation effect has been demonstrated under varying conditions 
and in different domains, the moderating role of eyewitnesses’ attribution of crime motives 
has not yet been considered. Attributions strongly relate to individuals’ cognitive schemata, 
which determine expectations, direct attention, and influence memory (e.g., Brewer & 
Treyens, 1981). Thus, misinformation confirming an eyewitness’ attributions of a 
perpetrator’s crime motives could bias eyewitness accounts of an observed event. Moreover, 
memory errors and consequently biased eyewitness reports are more likely to occur for 
negative events eliciting negative emotions (Porter, Bellhouse, McDougall, Ten Brinke, & 
Wilson, 2010). On this basis, we anticipate that attributions of crime motives for violent 
crimes are especially likely to influence eyewitness reports. 
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Attribution of Crime Motives and Memory Distortion 
Research on attribution theory examines how individuals explain their own as well as 
others’ behaviour and what information they use for making causal attributions (see Harvey & 
Weary, 1984; Malle, 2011). Weiner (1986) developed a taxonomy, according to which 
attributions are depicted on the dimensions locus, stability, and controllability. In the present 
research, we focus on the dimension locus: Causes of behaviour are attributed either to the 
person or to the situation. Explaining an observed behaviour based on the actor’s personality 
is a dispositional attribution, whereas explaining the same observation through the 
surrounding situational circumstances is a situational attribution (see e.g., Wetmore, 
Neuschatz, & Gronlund, 2014). Imagine somebody arrives late for an appointment. A 
situational explanation could be a traffic jam because of an accident, whereas a dispositional 
attribution could be that the person does not care about punctuality. A well-known example of 
an attributional bias is the “fundamental attribution error” (i.e., a general tendency to 
underestimate the influence of situational factors and to overestimate the influence of 
dispositional factors; Ross, 1977). 
Some evidence suggests that attributions are triggered when (positive) expectations are 
violated and consequently a search for explanations is prompted (e.g., Bohner, Bless, 
Schwarz, & Strack, 1988; Gendolla & Koller, 2001). Thus, being exposed to information that 
does not comply with a cognitive schema can initiate attributions. Individuals are better able 
to remember schema-consistent information than inconsistent information and make more use 
of the former (e.g., Judd & Kulik, 1980; Sentis & Burnstein, 1979). As a result, an activated 
schema can falsify perceptions retrospectively and cause a selective search for schema-
consistent information (e.g., Kleider et al., 2008; Roediger et al., 2001). Prior research has 
studied the relationship between attributions and biased information processing. For instance, 
evaluating negative behaviour can lead to “blame-validation” which in turn results in a biased 
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search for information that confirms the ascribed blame (Alicke, 2000). According to Alicke 
(2000, p. 568), this confirmation bias is “encouraged by the tendency to view people rather 
than the environment as the prepotent controlling forces behind harmful events”.  
In a related vein, Pizarro, Laney, Morris, and Loftus (2006) found that attributions of 
responsibility affected individuals’ memories. They presented participants with a story 
describing an individual showing immoral behaviour. Some participants learned that the 
negative act was intentional and the person actually enjoyed it, other participants learned that 
it was not intentional. When recalling information about the event, participants in the former 
group remembered the behaviour as more immoral than originally reported (also see Remijn 
& Crombag, 2007). 
In line with this reasoning, we argue that an individual’s assumptions regarding a 
perpetrator’s reasons for committing a crime influences their memories of the observed event: 
If eyewitnesses believed that a crime had been committed for purely selfish motives (e.g., 
greed, hate) that specifically hint at the perpetrator’s personality, a specific cognitive schema 
is activated. This schema in turn distorts the processing of information related to the crime 
and the perpetrator’s actions resulting in a biased representation of the observed event. 
Attribution of Crime Motives and Sentencing 
Attribution of crime motives can also impact sentencing decisions. The same incident 
is assessed differently depending on perceivers’ attributions. For example, the degree to which 
aggressive behaviour is judged as morally reprehensible depends on the motives seen to 
underlie it (Reeder, Kuma, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimov, 2002). Malle (2006) showed that 
morally reprehensible incidents are more likely to be considered as intentional. These, in turn, 
can influence attributions of blame and responsibility (e.g., Gebotys & Dasgupta, 1987; 
Walster, 1966). The less socially desirable a behaviour and the lower the external pressure on 
the actor, the more certain observers ascribe intentionality. In a series of experiments, 
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Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley (2006) manipulated the situational pressure under which 
aggressive behaviour was perceived. They found that less responsibility and blame were 
attributed to an aggressor exposed to high external pressure than to an aggressor who was 
exposed to little or no pressure. 
These findings are of practical relevance in legal settings. For example, § 46, I in the 
German Penal Code and Section 143 in the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 require that the 
extent of guilt should determine the length of the prison sentence for a criminal act. However, 
a biased assessment of the intention of an action can disadvantage a defendant in court. 
Research has shown, for instance, that mock-jurors and judges give more severe sentences if 
they attributed behavioural causes to the personality of the perpetrator (dispositional 
attribution) compared to situational constraints (situational attribution; e.g., Carroll & Payne, 
1976; Cochran, Boots, & Heide, 2003; Hawkins, 1981). 
In the present study, we attempt to replicate the finding that a dispositional attribution 
of crime motives leads to more severe sentencing than a situational attribution of crime 
motives. While prior studies have focussed on male perpetrators committing minor moral or 
legal transgressions (e.g., Gebotys & Dasgupta, 1987; Malle, 2006; Reeder et al., 2002; cf. 
Hawkins, 1981), our perpetrator is a woman who commits several homicides. 
The Present Research 
We predict that attributions of crime motives can bias eyewitnesses’ memories of an 
observed event as follows: Misinformation that corresponds to eyewitnesses’ attributions of 
crime motives is accepted as true and integrated into the memory of the observed event, even 
if the information is objectively false. In contrast, misinformation that contradicts 
eyewitnesses’ attributions of crime motives is more likely to be correctly rejected as false. To 
test this hypothesis, we reverted to Weiner’s attribution dimension locus in two experiments. 
We predict that eyewitnesses led to adopt a dispositional attribution of crime motives (e.g., 
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hate) will falsely remember misinformation consistent with a dispositional attribution and 
correctly reject misinformation corresponding to a situational attribution. Concurrently, 
eyewitnesses with a situational attribution of crime motives (e.g., self-defence) will falsely 
remember misinformation consistent with a situational attribution and will correctly reject 
misinformation that corresponds to a dispositional attribution. Additionally, we tested a 
second hypothesis that a dispositional vs. situational attribution of crime motives leads to 
more severe sentencing. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were N = 130 undergraduate students from different University 
departments (110 male, 19 female, one person did not indicate her/his gender) with a mean 
age of M = 23.35 years (SD = 2.69). In both studies, participants received adequate 
compensation for their participation and were carefully debriefed.
1
 Experiment 1 consisted of 
a 3 (attribution: dispositional vs. situational vs. control group; between-subjects) X 2 
(distractor type: dispositional vs. situational; within-subjects) mixed factorial design. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were informed that the study aimed at identifying associations between 
certain personality traits and processing of violence in movies. Thus, they first worked on 
several personality measures in order to ensure the credibility of this cover story. Next, 
participants saw a film sequence of about six minutes without sound. The film was compiled 
from scenes of the movie “Monster”, where a female protagonist kills four men for no 
obvious reason. Between the killings, neutral scenes are displayed (e.g., the protagonist 
                                                 
1
 Fourteen participants already knew the movie we had chosen for the experimental manipulation (see Materials 
and Procedure) or correctly guessed the purpose of the experiment in a post-experimental suspicion check. 
Their data were not included in the analyses, resulting in the sample described above. Excluded datasets were 
equally distributed to the experimental conditions, χ²(2, N = 144) = 0.118, p = .943. 
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smoking a cigarette) as well as ambiguous scenes (e.g., an argument between the protagonist 
and another person). 
After watching the film compilation, participants in the two experimental conditions 
were instructed that they would read a film review of the complete film. Supposedly, a student 
from the “University of Television and Film Studies” in Munich had written this film review. 
We made reference to this university to increase the credibility of our cover story and ensure 
participants’ compliance. In the film review, the complete content and several details of the 
film sequence were mentioned. Additionally, more information on the presumed background 
of the film and the protagonist’s motives were given. With this background information, the 
experimental conditions of the independent variable attribution were varied. Participants in 
the dispositional attribution condition (DisA condition) learned that the protagonist’s motives 
for the killings included base motives caused by her personality (e.g., hate, cold-bloodedness). 
The text in this condition explicitly emphasised the ferocity of the killings. By subtly 
providing information on the (ostensible) reasons and the further factual circumstances of the 
homicides, participants in the DisA condition were led to conclude that the perpetrator acted 
out of dispositional crime motives, directly linked to the perpetrator’s personality. 
In contrast, participants in the situational attribution condition (SitA condition) were 
made to believe that the protagonist mostly acted out of situational constraints (e.g., self-
defence, despair). Here, the text explicitly emphasised the protagonist’s predicament that 
made her act like she did (e.g., “… She feels cornered and her attack rather seems to be a 
defence.”). Providing such (ostensible) reasons and further factual circumstances of the 
homicides that alluded to situational circumstances should lead participants to conclude that 
the perpetrator acted out of situational crime motives that were not directly linked to her 
personality. 
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Furthermore, an exploratory neutral control group was implemented: Participants in 
the control group received no additional background information on the protagonist’s 
supposed crime motives in the form of a film review. They were thus not subjected to any 
kind of misinformation and had to rely on their own explanations for the perpetrator’s 
behaviour. If a memory bias occurs in the control group, it should be due either to 
unsystematic bias in memory or to a memory bias caused by the individual crime motive 
attribution. According to research in the domain of the fundamental attribution error (e.g., 
Ross, 1977), participants in the control group should typically perceive the perpetrator’s crime 
motives as dispositionally caused. 
Dependent Variables 
In order to gain a measure of sentencing, participants were asked to indicate a prison 
sentence for the perpetrator (“If you were to set the length of a prison sentence for the 
perpetrator from the movie: For how many years should she be imprisoned in your 
opinion?”). Participants could tick one of 40 boxes (0 years to > 39 years). If the box > 39 
years was ticked, data were coded with 40 years. Additionally, participants were asked to 
decide whether they judged the death penalty to be appropriate in the case at hand (yes or no). 
An open-ended question on participants’ attribution of the perpetrator’s crime motives (“What 
do you think, why did the perpetrator kill the men?”) served as a manipulation check for the 
independent variable. 
Next, participants worked on a recognition test with 40 items on the film compilation 
they had been shown (see Appendix A). They were asked to indicate whether they had seen or 
had not seen each item. The recognition test included 33 target items, four distractor items 
matching a dispositional attribution of crime motives (dispositional distractors), and three 
distractor items matching a situational attribution of crime motives (situational distractors).
2
 
                                                 
2
 All distractor items of Experiments 1 and 2 were tested regarding their suitability with a separate sample of 
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Importantly, the distractor items referred to information that had neither been shown in 
the film, nor been mentioned in the film review (misinformation), whereas target items 
referred to information that had been shown in the film and additionally been mentioned in 
the film review (original information). Thus, in the recognition test target items should 
correctly be identified as original information from the film and distractor items should 
correctly be rejected as misinformation that had not been shown in the film. 
The target hit rate (i.e., proportion of correctly identified true information) is a 
measure of general memory performance and thus serves as a baseline. In order to ascertain 
an accurate measure of participants’ susceptibility to misinformation, the rates of dispositional 
and situational distractors that participants falsely identified as correct (“false alarms”) were 
each adjusted for participants’ overall memory performance in terms of their target hit rates 
(Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Adjusted false alarms consisted of the residuals of a regression 
analysis with false alarm rates as criterion and target hit rates as predictors (i.e., individuals’ 
false alarm rates were corrected for participants’ general ability to correctly identify true 
information). 
                                                                                                                                                        
N = 25 participants who were familiar with the basics of attribution theory. They first read one of the film 
reviews used in the main experiments implying a situational (n = 12) vs. dispositional (n = 13) attribution of 
crime motives. Next, they rated each distractor item with respect to Weiner’s (1986) attribution dimensions 
stability (“To what extent do you evaluate this statement as something that is variable or stable with respect to 
time?”; 1 = variable to 9 = stable), controllability (“To what extent do you evaluate this statement as 
something that is uncontrollable or controllable?”; 1 = uncontrollable to 9 = controllable), and locus (“To 
what extent do you evaluate this statement as something that is due to the respective situation or the person?”; 
1 = situation to 9 = person). Additionally, each item was rated regarding its valence (“To what extent do you 
evaluate this statement as something negative or positive?”; 1 = negative to 9 = positive). The distractor items 
were presented in randomised order. Four separate 2 (attribution: dispositional vs. situational; between-
subjects) X 2 (distractor type: dispositional vs. situational; within-subjects) mixed factorial MANOVAs were 
conducted. As intended, dispositional distractors were attributed more to the person (M = 6.06, SD = 1.28) and 
situational distractors were attributed more to the situation (M = 4.64, SD = 1.38), F(1, 23) = 9.80, p = .005, 
ηp
2
 = .30. Concurrently, there was no main effect of attribution condition, F(1, 23) < 1, and no interaction 
between attribution condition and distractor type, F(1, 23) = 1.00, p = .327. Furthermore, no main effects and 
no interactions were detected with respect to the other attributions dimensions, all F(1, 23) < 4.11, all ps > .05. 
However, dispositional distractors were regarded as more negative (M = 2.76, SD = 1.24) than situational 
distractors (M = 4.98, SD = 1.12), F(1, 23) = 41.81, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .65. No effect of attribution condition, F(1, 
23) = 2.84, p = .106, and no interaction, F(1, 23) < 1, revealed. Potential limitations of the chosen distractor 
items are addressed in the “General Discussion” section. 
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
Following Cochran et al. (2003), two independent judges categorised each mentioned 
motive as dispositional (e.g., “hate”) or situational (e.g., “self-defence”). To display 
participant’s attribution of the perpetrator’s crime motives, we calculated the difference of the 
sum of the dispositional and the sum of the situational motive ratings for each judge (inter-
judge agreement: r = .85) and averaged the ratings. 
The manipulation of crime motives had a significant influence on presumed crime 
motives, F(2, 127) = 11.48, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .15. To test the specific influence of the 
manipulation, we conducted a contrast analysis (DisA: λ = -1, SitA: λ = 1, control group: λ = 
0). As expected, participants in the DisA condition attributed the perpetrator’s crime motives 
as highly dispositional (M = -1.01, SD = 1.61), whereas participants in the SitA condition 
attributed the perpetrator’s crime motives as situationally caused (M = 0.58, SD = 1.49), 
t(127) = 4.68, p < .001. Thus, the manipulation of crime motive attribution had the intended 
effect. Participants in the control group attributed the perpetrator’s crime motives to 
dispositional causes (M = -0.51, SD = 1.65), their judgments did not differ from DisA 
condition participants’ judgments (DisA: λ = -1, SitA: λ = 0, control group: λ = 1), t(127) = 
1.46, p = .146. This is in line with research on the fundamental attribution error. Since no 
further information on the perpetrator’s crime motives was available, participants perceived 
the observed actions as caused by the perpetrator’s dispositional characteristics. 
Recognition Test 
Overall, the target hit rate was 0.74 (i.e., on average participants identified 74% of all 
target items correctly as true information) and did not depend on the factor attribution, F(2, 
127) < 1. Thus, attribution of crime motives did not influence participants’ ability to correctly 
identify true information of the observed event. On average participants falsely identified 6% 
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of all distractor items as true. The overall rate of false alarms was also independent of 
experimental condition, F(2, 127) = 1.57, p = .213. 
Next, we conducted a 3 (DisA vs. SitA vs. control group) X 2 (dispositional vs. 
situational distractor) mixed factorial MANOVA to test our main hypothesis that participants 
in the DisA (SitA) condition more often falsely identify dispositional (situational) distractors 
vs. situational (dispositional) distractors as true. As described above, we used the rate of false 
alarms adjusted for individuals’ target hit rate as a measure of participants’ susceptibility to 
misinformation. The analysis yielded no main effect of crime motive attribution on the overall 
adjusted rate of false alarms, F(2, 127) = 1.91, p = .153, and no main effect of distractor type, 
F(1, 127) < 1. 
In line with our hypothesis, a significant interaction emerged, F(2, 127) = 4.21, p = 
.017, ηp
2
 = .06 (see Figure 1): Participants were more likely to falsely identify distractors 
consistent with their crime motive attribution than attribution-inconsistent distractors. 
Contrast analyses indicated that participants in the DisA condition showed higher rates of 
adjusted false alarms regarding dispositional distractors than participants in the SitA condition 
and the control group, t(127) = 2.30, p = .023 (DisA: λ = 1, SitA: λ = -0.5, control group: λ = -
0.5). Additionally, participants in the SitA condition showed higher rates of adjusted false 
alarms regarding situational distractors than participants in the DisA condition and the control 
group, t(127) = 2.45, p = .016 (DisA: λ = -0.5, SitA: λ = 1, control group: λ = -0.5). 
Furthermore, participants in the SitA condition more often falsely identified situational vs. 
dispositional distractors as true, F(1, 43) = 4.09, p = .049, ηp
2
 = .09. However, participants in 
the DisA condition did not show significantly higher adjusted false alarms regarding 
dispositional (vs. situational) distractors, F(1, 42) = 2.72, p = .107. 
In sum, the results support our hypothesis: Misinformation consistent with individuals’ 
attribution of crime motives was more likely to be falsely recognised as true than 
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misinformation that contradicted their attribution of crime motives. In the subgroup of 
participants who were led to believe that the perpetrator acted out of dispositional motives, the 
direct comparison did not reach statistical significance (the descriptive statistics pointed at the 
predicted direction). This might possibly be due to a ceiling effect of false alarms relating to 
the dispositional distractor items. Hence, we aimed at optimising our materials in 
Experiment 2. 
Sentencing 
The experimentally varied attribution of crime motives tended to affect participants’ 
demands for the perpetrator’s imprisonment, F(2, 123) = 2.83, p = .063, ηp
2
 = .04 (see Table 
1). As expected, participants in the DisA condition claimed a harsher sentence for the 
perpetrator than participants in the SitA condition (DisA: λ = 1, SitA: λ = -1, control group: λ 
= 0), t(123) = 2.37, p = .019. Again, the judgments of participants in the control group did not 
differ from the DisA condition participants’ judgments (DisA: λ = 1, SitA: λ = 0, control 
group: λ = -1), t(123) = 1.03, p = .306. 
The results on support of the death penalty in the case at hand were consistent with the 
findings on imprisonment, χ²(2, N = 129) = 6.81, p = .033, Cramér’s V = .23 (see Figure 2): 
DisA condition participants were more in favour of the death penalty in the present case than 
SitA condition participants. Attitudes of participants in the control group were similar to those 
of the DisA condition participants (see Figure 2). Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons revealed 
that only SitA condition participants’ judgments differed significantly from the other groups, p 
< .050. In sum, the findings on imprisonment and support for the death penalty are in line 
with other research in this domain (Carroll & Payne, 1976; Cochran et al., 2003; Hawkins, 
1981) and confirm our hypothesis that sentencing is influenced by individuals’ attribution of 
crime motives. 
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that an individual’s assumption about why a 
perpetrator committed heinous acts biases memory of the observed event. Participants 
accepted misinformation that matched their attribution of the perpetrator’s crime motives as 
true. To our best knowledge, this effect has not been shown before. We thus conceptually 
replicated these findings in Experiment 2 with the following refinements to the study design. 
First, we added a third type of distractor in order to be able to implement an even more 
precise measure of memory distortion. In their meta-analysis, Stangor and McMillan (1992) 
highlighted the need for recognition tests adjustments. These authors found that “recognition 
measures that are not corrected for response tendencies showed a strong bias toward 
expectancy-congruent information” (p. 55). To provide an even more conservative test of our 
main hypothesis, we applied an additional adjustment of individuals’ rate of false alarms 
using a neutral distractor item. In doing so, we were able to not only correct the rates of false 
alarms for an individual’s overall ability to correctly identify originally encoded information 
(as in Experiment 1), but over and above we were able to adjust the rates of false alarms for 
participants’ general ability to correctly reject neutral misinformation (for further details see 
the “Dependent Variables” paragraph of Experiment 2). 
Second, we omitted the control group. Participants in the control group of Experiment 
1 mostly attributed the perpetrator’s crime motives as dispositionally caused because they did 
not have any background information. Overall their answers were not significantly different 
from those of participants in the DisA condition. 
Third, an examination of the raw data of Experiment 1 revealed that there was one 
dispositional distractor item (“Did you see how the perpetrator stole the gun?”) that literally 
no participant falsely identified as true. As a consequence, this distractor item was replaced in 
Experiment 2. Additionally, another situational distractor (in addition to the neutral distractor) 
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was added to the recognition test in order to improve the materials (for further details see the 
“Dependent Variables” paragraph of Experiment 2 as well as the Appendix B).  
Fourth, we used a different cover story and informed participants that the study was set 
in the domain of sentencing in order to explore whether legislative changes might be due. 
Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1 we refrained from assessing any personality measures. 
Method 
Participants 
N = 79 undergraduate students (68 male, 11 female) from different University 
departments were recruited as participants (Mage = 22.89, SD = 1.83).
3
 Experiment 2 consisted 
of a 2 (attribution: dispositional vs. situational; between-subjects) X 2 (distractor type: 
dispositional vs. situational; within-subjects) mixed factorial design. 
Materials and Procedure 
If participants consented to take part in the study, they saw the same film as in 
Experiment 1. Afterwards, participants in the dispositional attribution (DisA) condition and 
the situational attribution (SitA) condition each were instructed to read the same film review 
of the complete film as in Experiment 1. 
Dependent Variables 
The measures on imprisonment, support of the death penalty and the manipulation 
check were identical to those of Experiment 1. However, regarding the recognition test, which 
followed next, some changes were made. First, we reduced the number of targets to 18 (see 
Appendix B). Second, we changed one dispositional distractor item that had not led to any 
false alarms in Experiment 1 and added another item to the set of situational distractors. 
Hence, in Experiment 2 four dispositional and four situational distractor items were used. 
                                                 
3
 Data of eight participants who already knew the movie “Monster” that was central to our experimental 
manipulation, or who held reasonable suspicions regarding the cover story of the experiment were excluded. 
Excluded datasets were equally distributed to the experimental conditions, χ²(1, N = 87) = 0.255, p = .614. 
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Third, we added a neutral distractor to the recognition test that served as an additional 
baseline for neutral memory errors. The false alarm rates for dispositional and situational 
distractors were each adjusted for participants’ overall ability to correctly identify true 
information (see Experiment 1). Additionally, participants’ false alarm rates were adjusted for 
their ability to correctly reject neutral misinformation. Consequently, adjusted false alarms 
consisted of the residuals of two regression analysis with false alarm rates regarding 
dispositional or situational distractors as criterion and target hit rates as well as neutral false 
alarm rates as predictors in each case. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
As in Experiment 1, participants’ judgments of the perpetrator’s crime motives were 
categorised by two independent judges and averaged (inter-judge agreement: r = .83) to gain a 
measure of crime motive attribution. The manipulation of crime motives had the intended 
effect on participants’ attributions, t(77) = 4.02, p < .001, d = 0.92. Participants in the DisA 
condition rated the perpetrator’s crime motives as highly dispositional (M = -0.92, SD = 1.79), 
whereas participants in the SitA condition attributed the perpetrator’s crime motives to 
situational factors (M = 0.49, SD = 1.30). 
Recognition Test 
On average, participants correctly identified 76% of all target items as true. As in 
Experiment 1, the target hit rate did not depend on the factor attribution, t(77) < 1. Hence, the 
manipulated attribution of crime motives did not affect participants’ overall ability to correctly 
identify original information. Overall, participants falsely identified 6% of all distractor items 
as true. Again, the rate of false alarms did not depend on the manipulation of crime motive 
attribution, t(77) < 1. 
Next, we conducted a 2 (DisA vs. SitA) X 2 (dispositional vs. situational distractor) 
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mixed factorial MANOVA using the adjusted false alarm rates as dependent variable (i.e., 
participants false alarm rates adjusted for their individual target hit rate and neutral false 
alarm rate). As expected, no main effects of attribution condition and distractor type was 
found, Fs < 1. In line with our main hypothesis, we found a significant interaction between 
attribution condition and distractor type, F(1, 77) = 14.24, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .16 (see Figure 3). 
Misinformation consistent with participants’ attribution of crime motives was more likely to 
be falsely recognised as true than misinformation inconsistent with participants’ attribution of 
crime motives. More specifically, participants in the DisA condition showed higher rates of 
adjusted false alarms regarding dispositional distractors than participants in the SitA 
condition, t(77) = 2.73, p = .008, d = 0.62, whereas participants in the SitA condition showed 
higher rates of adjusted false alarms regarding situational distractors than participants in the 
DisA condition, t(77) = 2.27, p = .026, d = 0.52. 
Furthermore, participants in the DisA condition showed higher rates of adjusted false 
alarms for dispositional vs. situational distractors, F(1, 36) = 5.79, p = .021, p
2
 = .14, while 
participants in the SitA condition showed higher rates of adjusted false alarms for situational 
vs. dispositional distractors, F(1, 41) = 9.15, p = .004, p
2
 = .18. 
These results support our main hypothesis. Participants led to believe that the 
perpetrator acted out of selfish motives were more likely to falsely remember misinformation 
that was in line with their attributions and to correctly reject misinformation that was not. The 
same applied for participants who were made to believe that the perpetrator’s crime motives 
were due to situational constraints. 
Sentencing 
Replicating the results from Experiment 1, participants in the DisA condition 
demanded a more severe prison sentence for the perpetrator than participants in the SitA 
condition, t(77) = 3.16, p = .002, d = 0.72 (see Table 1). Furthermore, participants in the DisA 
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condition were more often in favour of the death penalty in the present case compared to 
participants in the SitA condition, χ²(1, N = 79) = 10.54, p = .001, φ = .37 (see Figure 2). 
Taken together, the results on sentencing confirm our hypothesis that a dispositional vs. 
situational attribution of crime motives results in more severe sentencing. These findings are 
in line with the results of Experiment 1 as well as with comparable research in this domain 
(Carroll & Payne, 1976; Cochran et al., 2003; Hawkins, 1981). 
General Discussion 
Numerous studies have shown how eyewitness memory for details can be altered by 
exposure to misinformation. However, eyewitnesses’ attributions of crime motives and their 
impact on eyewitness memory have been neglected despite its importance in decisions in real 
life cases. Both studies reported here show that attributions of crime motives affect 
individuals’ memory reports as well as their sentencing decisions. 
Our results demonstrate that participants’ memory reports of a witnessed crime were 
consistent with the misinformation we provided regarding dispositional or situational causes 
of the perpetrator’s behaviour. Following Stangor and McMillan’s (1992) meta-analysis, we 
carefully adjusted our memory measure: We not only partialled out participants’ overall 
memory performance in terms of their ability to correctly identify true information in a 
recognition test (Experiments 1 and 2), but also adjusted for their ability to correctly reject 
neutral misinformation (Experiment 2). Importantly, although we considered the necessary 
corrections for expectancy-congruent response biases, individuals were still strongly biased 
towards misinformation consistent with their attribution of crime motives. 
Our findings are in line with those of other studies examining the effects of cognitive 
schemata on memory accuracy. Brewer and Treyens (1981), for instance, found a strong 
association between participants’ expectations based on place schemata and recognition errors 
regarding schema-consistent objects. Similarly, Roediger et al. (2001) reported an especially 
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strong “social contagion effect” for schema-consistent information (cf. Nemeth & Belli, 
2006). 
Causal attributions can be perceived as cognitive schemata (e.g., Gawronski, 2003; 
Kelley, 1972) and essentially operate in the same manner as other cognitive schemata and 
scripts (i.e., direct attention and information processing; Brewer & Treyens, 1981). The 
research of Pizarro et al. (2006), for example, supports this line of reasoning: Participants’ 
attributions of blame affected their memory of the original event following a delay of one 
week. Additionally, the amount of attributed blame was associated with the observed degree 
of memory distortion (also see Remijn & Crombag, 2007). However, these authors did not 
consider individuals’ assumptions about whether the person of interest acted out of 
dispositional reasons or due to situational constraints applying Weiner’s (1986) dimension 
locus as we did here. A study of alternative variations of crime motive attribution, for instance 
Weiner’s dimensions stability and controllability, could yield interesting insights regarding 
factors governing sentencing decisions. In line with the aforementioned reasoning, stable vs. 
unstable as well as controllable vs. uncontrollable attributions of crime motives should entail 
more severe sentencing demands. For example, if a perpetrator’s violent behaviour is 
regarded as stable (e.g., because s/he has already shown the same criminal behaviour before), 
individuals may demand a more severe sentence as compared to individuals who regard the 
perpetrator’s behaviour as unstable (e.g., because s/he has not shown violent or other criminal 
behaviour before). Furthermore, the same recognition bias as in the present experiments 
should emerge if participants receive misinformation consistent with a stable vs. unstable or 
controllable vs. uncontrollable attribution of crime motives. We will return to this point later 
when we consider the law with respect to evidence of prior character or past misconduct. 
With respect to our materials, our manipulation of a situational attribution of crime 
motives has a shortcoming, namely the fact that the perpetrator in question had killed four 
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persons on different occasions. However, the results of both manipulation checks demonstrate 
that the chosen manipulation of the independent variable had the desired effects on 
participants’ attribution. Thus, despite the fact that the perpetrator had killed four persons, we 
were able to evoke a more situational (or less dispositional) crime motive attribution in the 
situational vs. dispositional attribution condition by providing specific background 
information implying the dominance of situational factors that led to the crime. Nevertheless, 
in future research the use of a single violent incident, for example, would provide a clearer 
test of the situational (vs. dispositional) hypothesis. 
Another limitation regarding our materials pertains to the distractor items. Although 
these items varied as intended only with respect to Weiner’s (1986) attribution dimension 
locus and not with respect to their evaluated controllability or stability, dispositional 
distractors were judged as more negative than situational distractors (see Footnote 2). In sum, 
the dispositional distractor items are consistent with the representation of a perpetrator acting 
out of “bad” dispositional motives, whereas the situational distractor items are consistent with 
the representation of a perpetrator acting out of “good” (or rather less bad) situational 
motives. Since our pilot tests and the manipulation checks revealed the desired differences 
regarding the dispositional vs. situational attribution, our results undoubtedly contribute to the 
domain of schema-consistent memory effects in eyewitness research. The extent to which the 
effect of valence may moderate the effect of attribution remains to be addressed in future 
research. 
However, our results regarding “attribution-consistency” may also be interpreted more 
broadly. The mean evaluation of the dispositional distractor items on the dimension locus 
significantly differs from the scale midpoint in the expected direction (p < .001), whereas the 
respective result for the situational items is not significant (p = .204) – although descriptively 
as intended and significantly differing from the evaluation of the dispositional items (see 
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Footnote 2). Thus, regarding dispositional attributions of crime motives, the conclusion of 
attribution-consistent memory reports is clearly substantiated by the present results. However, 
regarding situational attribution it is less clear whether we observed effects of “lesser” 
dispositional attribution or actual situational attribution. Thus, further studies will have to 
confirm whether or not the attribution-consistency interpretation has widespread applicability 
in the case of situational attribution of crime motives. 
In line with the studies reported here, Tuckey and Brewer (2003) described an overall 
memory advantage for information that was relevant to a crime schema as compared to 
schema-irrelevant information. However, according to these authors, participants’ crime 
schemata influenced their interpretation and memory of ambiguous stimuli in that participants 
showed more schema-consistent memory intrusions (also see Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 
1998). Additionally, Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins, and Toglia (2002) found higher 
memory accuracy for schema-consistent items as compared to schema-inconsistent items, 
especially after an increased time interval. Charman et al. (2009) presented related results in 
the domain of face recognition: Mock-investigators’ as well as mock-jurors’ guilt attributions 
strongly biased their judgements of whether a suspect resembled a facial composite of a 
perpetrator (see also Kleider, Cavrak, & Knuycky, 2012, regarding stereotype-consistent 
recognition errors). Similarly, a presumption of guilt can lead forensic investigators to be 
biased in their matching of a fingerprint to a suspect (Kassin et al., 2013). 
Research has repeatedly shown that post-event misinformation does not only alter specific 
details in memory reports of an observed event, but moreover completely new details can be 
implemented into eyewitnesses’ testimonies (see Loftus, 2005). In the experiments at hand, 
the consequences of post-event information on false memories were clearly apparent. For 
example, in the present studies a knife was neither shown in the originally encoded 
information, nor was it mentioned as post-event misinformation. Yet, participants indicated 
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that the perpetrator had herself been threatened with a knife by one of the victims (confirming 
a situational attribution in terms of self-defence) or that the perpetrator had even threatened 
her girlfriend with a knife (confirming a dispositional attribution in terms of general 
aggressiveness). However, at present we cannot say if this bias is due to actually distorted 
eyewitness memory or merely constitutes evidence of a bias in eyewitnesses’ reports (e.g., 
memory conformity; Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003). We do not know whether participants 
only believed that, for instance, the perpetrator was threatened by one of the victims, or if they 
actually remembered the respective situation. Kleider et al. (2008) observed that stereotype-
consistent memory errors grew stronger after a two-day delay (also see Neuschatz et al., 
2002). They interpreted this increase over time to the following: “original memories 
presumably fade, and source errors are increasingly experienced as ‘true memories’” (p. 16). 
Similarly and in line with the misinformation effect literature, our results suggest distortions 
in eyewitness memory as compared to mere distortions in eyewitness reports. We urge 
researchers to address this important question in more detail (e.g., by implementing a 
remember/know procedure; Tulving, 1985). 
In the present research, we were able to show that individuals’ beliefs about a 
perpetrator’s reasons for committing a crime influence their decision making in terms of 
sentencing. Confirming previous research, student participants as mock-jurors demanded a 
more severe sentence in terms of imprisonment and support for the death penalty if they 
attributed the perpetrator’s behaviour to dispositional motives as compared to situational 
constraints. Carroll and Payne (1976), for example, found that students (but not expert parole 
decision makers) in the role of mock-jurors demanded more severe punishment following 
dispositional attributions as compared to situational attributions. However, in this study, the 
attribution dimensions stability and locus were not independently varied between-subjects. 
Cochran et al. (2003) reported that individuals with a dispositional attribution style recruited 
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through jury-pool surveys were more likely to recommend a death sentence than individuals 
with situational attribution styles. In a similar study, Hawkins (1981) observed that a 
dispositional attribution of crime motives led to a more severe punishment compared to a 
situational attribution. However, in his study attribution of crime motives was not varied 
directly. The present findings add to the existing literature in that the relevant attribution 
dimensions were manipulated directly and between-subjects and thus constitute convincing 
evidence of the influence of crime motive attributions on individual decision making. 
Additionally, we extended the applicability of the findings to a female perpetrator committing 
serious crimes. 
Numerous factors can impact jurors’ decision making. Ruva and Gagnon (2013), for 
instance, found that pretrial publicity affected mock-jurors’ decision making in terms of guilt 
verdicts. According to Wetmore et al. (2014), secondary confessions lead to higher conviction 
rates in mock-jurors. Antonio (2006) reported that jurors were more likely to seek a death 
sentence than a lifetime imprisonment when the defendant appeared bored during the trial. 
Jones and Kaplan (2003) described a stereotypical race bias that affected mock-jurors’ 
attributions and punishment and thus provided “first evidence that attributional processes 
underlie the race-congruency effect” (p. 9). Importantly, in the Jones and Kaplan study a 
dispositional crime motive attribution was the strongest predictor of guilty verdicts. 
Moreover, the effect of race-crime congruence on verdict-confidence was mediated by 
dispositional attributions. Conducting similar analyses in the present research revealed no 
such effects: Neither in Experiment 1, nor in Experiment 2 did attribution-consistent memory 
distortions mediate the effect of crime motive attribution on sentencing. Since attribution-
consistent memory distortions were not associated with sentencing, it seems that participants 
based their sentencing decisions primarily on their attribution of crime motives – 
independently of their recollections of the witnessed crime. A likely reason is that participants 
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were making their judgements based on a simulated event (a movie). Future research should 
address the broader question of the psychological processes underlying crime motive 
attributions’ effects on sentencing. 
As Smith and Studebaker (1996) have pointed out, individuals’ prior knowledge (and 
thus their expectations) influences information processing in terms of fact-finding as well as 
sentencing (e.g., Smith, 1993), which is in turn of practical relevance: “If jurors fill gaps in 
the available evidence with typical information, then the resulting representation of the event 
may be perceived as more typical of the crime” (Smith & Studebaker, 1996, p. 530). This also 
applies to eyewitnesses. As eyewitness reports often serve as basis for judges’ and juries’ 
verdicts (e.g., Bell & Loftus, 1989), the problem of biased eyewitness reports has already 
been acknowledged (e.g., by implementing the cognitive interview; Centofanti & Reece, 
2006; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). Schema theory suggests that under difficult 
retrieval conditions, individuals likely rely on their cognitive schemata (e.g., Brewer & 
Treyens, 1981). However, in the present studies we did not include a filler task between 
encoding and retention phase, participants knew in advance that they would be questioned 
regarding the observed event, and the encoding situation was nearly optimal. Thus, it is even 
more noteworthy that attribution-consistent memory distortions were observed.  
Pizarro et al. (2006, p. 554) hinted at the fact that memory distortions in eyewitnesses 
could place a suspect “in a position of disadvantage”. Legal systems have already 
acknowledged the biasing potential of introducing evidence of a defendant’s character to 
some extent. In the UK, for instance, evidence of the defendant’s “bad character” is only 
permissible under certain conditions (Sections 98 to 113 in the Criminal Justice Act 2003) and 
presumably is in place to prevent stable attribution of crime motives. Our research with 
college students may limit the generalisability of our findings, but it shows that even educated 
lay persons use the inferences they make about a suspect’s character in their decision making. 
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Appendix A 
 
Target Items in Experiment 1 
The perpetrator had brown eyes. 
Did you see that the perpetrator sat in a restaurant with her girlfriend? 
The perpetrator’s girlfriend wore a black pullover in the restaurant. 
When the perpetrator drove the first victim’s car, she was wearing gloves. 
The perpetrator shot all of her victims. 
The perpetrator walked down the deserted road in the dark. 
Did you see the restaurant manager’s glasses? 
Did you see that the perpetrator walked through the wood with one of her victims? 
The purse with the picture was black. 
Did you see that the perpetrator threatened her last victim with a gun in the car? 
Did you see that the perpetrator talked to one of her victims? 
Regarding the argument between the perpetrator and the manager in the restaurant, two 
kitchen assistants came to his aid. 
The perpetrator forced one of her victims to drive onto a meadow. 
As the perpetrator loaded the gun, one could see her piggybank. 
Did you see that the perpetrator aimed at her mirror image with the gun? 
In one scene, the perpetrator wore a leather jacket. 
The perpetrator’s girlfriend had dark hair. 
Did you see the perpetrator smoking a cigarette? 
The picture in the victim’s purse showed the man with his wife. 
The perpetrator had blonde hair. 
The perpetrator got changed after the first murder. 
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The perpetrator and her girlfriend met at a hotel room. 
Did you see that the perpetrator cried after the second murder? 
In one scene, the perpetrator looked at her naked body in the mirror. 
Did you see that the perpetrator beat her first victim after she had shot at the man? 
Did you see that the perpetrator threw money at her girlfriend in the hotel room? 
The manager wanted to detain the women from smoking in the restaurant. 
Did you see that the perpetrator threw anything out of the window while driving? 
The perpetrator killed her second victim in the car. 
The perpetrator lit he girlfriend’s cigarette with a zippo. 
Did you see that the TV in the hotel room was on? 
In one scene, the perpetrator wore a cap. 
The perpetrator shoved the manager against a table. 
 
Dispositional Distractor Items in Experiment 1 
Did you see the gun lying on the bed when the perpetrator entered the hotel room? 
Did you see that the perpetrator threatened her girlfriend with a knife? 
The perpetrator had a skull tattoo on her arm. 
Did you see how the perpetrator stole the gun? 
 
Situational Distractor Items in Experiment 1 
Did you see that the perpetrator gave her girlfriend a packet of cigarettes as a present? 
One of the men threatened the perpetrator with a knife. 
Did you see the teddy bear lying on the bed in the hotel room? 
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Appendix B 
 
Target Items in Experiment 2 
The perpetrator was about 30 years old. 
Did you see that the perpetrator sat in a restaurant with her girlfriend? 
The perpetrator’s girlfriend wore a black pullover in the restaurant. 
When the perpetrator drove the first victim’s car, she was wearing gloves. 
The perpetrator shot all of her victims. 
The purse with the picture was black. 
Did you see the restaurant manager’s glasses? 
Did you see that the perpetrator walked through the wood with one of her victims? 
Did you see that the perpetrator threatened her last victim with a gun in the car? 
Did you see that the perpetrator talked to one of her victims? 
Regarding the argument between the perpetrator and the manager in the restaurant, two 
kitchen assistants came to his aid. 
The perpetrator had brown eyes. 
Did you see that the perpetrator threw money at her girlfriend in the hotel room? 
Did you see that the perpetrator aimed at her mirror image with the gun? 
The perpetrator’s girlfriend had dark hair. 
Did you see the perpetrator smoking a cigarette? 
Did you see that the perpetrator beat her first victim after she had shot at the man? 
The perpetrator had blonde hair. 
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Dispositional Distractor Items in Experiment 2 
The perpetrator kicked one victim’s dog. 
Did you see the gun lying on the bed when the perpetrator entered the hotel room? 
Did you see that the perpetrator threatened her girlfriend with a knife? 
The perpetrator had a skull tattoo on her arm. 
 
Situational Distractor Items in Experiment 2 
Did you see that the perpetrator gave her girlfriend a packet of cigarettes as a present? 
Did you see that the perpetrator petted the dog of the victim? 
On the bed in the hotel room lay a teddy bear. 
One of the men threatened the perpetrator with a knife. 
 
Neutral Distractor Item in Experiment 2 
Did you see the bathrobe hanging at the bathroom door? 
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Table 1 
Participants’ demanded imprisonment of the perpetrator (means and standard deviations in 
years) depending on attribution condition in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
 
Dispositional 
Attribution Condition 
Situational Attribution 
Condition 
Control 
Group 
Overall 
Exp. 1 
35.49 
(7.65) 
30.14 
(11.03) 
33.19 
(11.58) 
32.92 
(10.42) 
Exp. 2 
36.84 
(7.03) 
30.74 
(9.73) 
- 
33.59 
(9.05) 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Rate of adjusted false alarms (adjusted for individual target hit rate) as a function of 
attribution condition (DisA vs. SitA vs. control group) and distractor type (dispositional vs. 
situational) in Experiment 1. 
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher rates of adjusted false alarms. 
 
Figure 2. Proportions of participants in support of and against the death penalty in the case at 
hand depending on attribution condition in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 3. Rate of false alarms (adjusted for individual target hit rate and neutral false alarms) 
as a function of attribution condition (DisA vs. SitA) and distractor type (dispositional vs. 
situational) in Experiment 2. 
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher rates of adjusted false alarms. 
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Figure 1. Rate of adjusted false alarms (adjusted for individual target hit rate) as a function of 
attribution condition (DisA vs. SitA vs. control group) and distractor type (dispositional vs. 
situational) in Experiment 1. 
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher rates of adjusted false alarms. 
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Figure 2. Proportions of participants in support of and against the death penalty in the case at 
hand depending on attribution condition in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
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Figure 3. Rate of false alarms (adjusted for individual target hit rate and neutral false alarms) 
as a function of attribution condition (DisA vs. SitA) and distractor type (dispositional vs. 
situational) in Experiment 2. 
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher rates of adjusted false alarms. 
